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Abstract
P2P streaming
streaming has grown in popularity, allowing people in many places to benefit from live audio
streaming has emerged as the predominant architecture
services. Mesh-based P2P streaming
architecture in realand television services.
chum and node failures,
failures, scalability,
scalability, and ease of maintenance.
maintenance. The
resilience to churn
world use because of its resilience
proliferation of these applications
applicationson the public Internet raises questions
questions about how they can be deployed
in a secure
secure and robust manner. Failing to address security
security vulnerabilities could facilitate
facilitate attacks
attacks with significant consequences
consequences such as content
content censorship,
censorship, unfair business competition,
competition,or external
external impact on the
evaluate neighbor selection attacks against mesh-based P2P
Internet itself.
itself. In this paper, we identify and evaluate
streaming which allow insider attackers
attackers to control the mesh overlay fonnation
formation and maintenance. We
streaming
demonstrate the effect of the attacks against a mesh-based P2P streaming system and propose a solution
attacks. Our solution
solution is scalable,
scalable, has low overhead,
overhead, and works in realistic
realistic heterogeto mitigate the attacks.
evaluate our solution
solution using a mesh-based P2P streaming
streaming system with real-world
neous networks.
networks. We evaluate
experiments on the PlanetLab Internet testbed and simulations
simulations using the OverSim P2P simulator.
simulator.
experiments

1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer streaming is rapidly maturing into a technology that offers scalable delivery of audio and video
content over the Internet. Several commercial efforts are exploring the use of peer-to-peer systems for live
media streaming [46,40,42,53,43,23,34,38,41,55,57,
[46,40,42,53,43,23,34,38,41,55,57, 19,50,54,27,62].
19,50,54,27,62]. High user demand for these
systems is demonstrated by their deployment in several countries [62, 59]
591 and their increasingly large user
base. For example, studies conducted for PPLive [40], one of the most popular systems today with over
350 channels, showed that it has been experiencing up to 400,000 simultaneous users, even having 200,000
simultaneous users watching a single channel [26]. Recent Internet studies also indicate that over 60% of
traffic is dominated by P2P systems [13], with video accounting for more than one-third of all Internet traffic
today [32].
Significant research has been conducted on the design and implementation of multicast overlay architectures as a platform for P2P streaming [11,
28]. Typically,
[I I, 37, 56, 63, 281.
Typically, such architectures have a neighbor
selection component that enables new nodes to join the overlay and a data plane component that facilitates
the flow of data. Based primarily on the structure of the data plane, two architectures for Internet P2P
streaming have emerged in recent years: tree-based and mesh-based architectures.
A tree-based streaming overlay constructs a tree in which the source broadcasting the stream is the root
of the tree and every other peer in the network is a child of either the source or another peer. While single tree-based routing topologies are simple and efficient, they may experience an imbalance in the load
on the peers as leaf nodes do not forward data. Multi-tree overlays were introduced to distribute bandwidth costs across participants by disseminating the data on multiple separate trees. Examples of single-tree
multicast overlays include ESM [15]
[I 51 and multi-tree multicast overlays include Chunkyspread [56]
[56] and SplitSplitStream [11].
[1 1].
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Figure 1;
1: Example of a unidirectional mesh-based streaming overlay in which the source sends two different
data chunks as denoted by the gray triangle and orange square. Each node has an in-neighbors
in-neighbors set and an
out-neighbors
out-neighbors set. For example, for node 6, the in-neighbors
in-neighbors set consists of node 7 and the source, while the
out-neighbors
out-neighbors set consists of nodes 1 and 9.

A mesh-based streaming overlay facilitates data dissemination in a less structured manner where peers
membership
exchange data with a subset of the nodes in the network which is initially obtained from some membership
server. The major difference between tree-based and mesh-based systems is that in mesh-based systems
server.
there is no predefined route in which data flows.
flows. Initial mesh-based systems used bidirectional meshes
where data can be sent and received in any direction. To capitalize on heterogeneous bandwidth capabilities
and at the same time not penalize low bandwidth nodes, recent systems use unidirectional meshes where data
is sent in only one direction (as seen in Figure 1). In unidirectional meshes each node maintains two sets of
neighbors, an in-neighbors
in-neighbors set and an out-neighbors
out-neighbors set. Nodes receive data from nodes in their in-neighbors
in-neighbors
out-neighbors set. A node decides on the number of out-neighbors
out-neighbors it can
set and send data to nodes in their out-neighbors
accept based on its available bandwidth. The number of in-neighbors
in-neighbors for a node is usually a system con[37] and CoolStreaminglDONet
CoolStreamingDONet [63].
stant. Examples of mesh-based multicast overlays include Chainsaw [37]
Several highly popular P2P streaming systems, such as PPLive [40] and PPStream [42], extend ideas from
[17] system for real-time streaming. Examples of unidirectional meshes include
the mesh-based BitTorrent [17]
Meshcast [10],
[lo], and Prime [31]. The mesh-based architecture has emerged as the predominant architecture
today because meshes are characteristically resilient to chum and node failures, while unidirectional meshes
efficiently use the heterogeneous bandwidth capabilities existent in real-world P2P deployments. Further[31] and real-world experiments [44]
[44] that mesh-based overlays
more, studies have shown in simulations [31]
perform better than tree-based overlays.
The proliferation of P2P streaming applications on the public Internet and the extrusion of multicast
functionality to end-systems that are more likely to be compromised than core routers [1],
[I 1, raises questions
about how P2P streaming can be deployed in a secure and robust manner. P2P streaming applications
have several characteristics that differentiate them from other P2P applications and make them an attractive
target for attack. First, since these applications mimic television, users expect to see and hear programs
quickly and without choppiness. Recent work showed that P2P streaming users are impatient [58], implying
that when choppiness occurs, users will change the channel or even stop using the system. Second, P2P
streaming applications have a real-time nature requiring audio and video packets to meet deadlines in order
Finally, these applications are bandwidth intensive, resulting in significant traffic
traffic
to be considered useful. Finally,
being received by a user. An attacker can exploit these characteristics to conduct attacks that may result
in targeted censorship of the content being broadcast, making particular channels unusable, or making the
broadcast unavailable in particular locations.
locations. With the commercial potential of such applications, one may
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expect unfair business competitors to utilize such attacks to decrease the client base of their competitors.
Indeed, P2P file
file sharing applications have been under similar attacks in the past, as files
files can easily be
[29]. Recent work has also shown that P2P streaming applications are extremely
polluted on such systems [29].
[21]. Finally, such attacks may be used by malicious entities to
vulnerable to pollution attacks themselves [21].
conduct DDoS against hosts external to the P2P overlay and impact the Internet itself, as it has been recently
[35, 20, 51]
511 by using real-life P2P systems.
demonstrated in [35,
focus on attacks against neighbor selection in unidirectional mesh-based P2P streaming
In this paper, we focus
applications. We focus on the mesh-based architecture as it is widely used and on the unidirectional variant
as it efficiently capitalizes on bandwidth heterogeneity existent in real-world P2P deployments due to the
[48, 14,
14, 9, 52].
521. An attacker can exploit the neighbor
presence of DSL, cable modem, and Ethernet links [48,
selection mechanism to be chosen to provide service for many nodes in the system. For example, in many
systems new nodes select the neighbors they will obtain service from by requesting the neighbor sets of
already known nodes. Attackers can dominate the honest nodes' neighbor sets by only referring other maliinfluence the overlay construction and maintenance,
cious nodes to honest nodes. As a result, an attacker can influence
traffic. This facilitates further atcontrolling a significant part of the overlay and consequently the overlay traffic.
tacks such as selective data forwarding, cheating, traffic analysis, overlay partitioning, or denial of service
against target nodes not even part of the overlay. Some of these attacks such as selective data forwarding or
denial of service may ultimately be noticed by the victim so they can be effectively
effectively addressed by deploying
a posteriori detection mechanism. However,
However, other attacks such as traffic
traffic analysis, do not have immediately
observable results. It is thus critical to address attacks against neighbors selection as they are the root of
those secondary attacks and their mitigation represents a general mechanism to prevent or mitigate a larger
attacks.
class of attacks.
While significant research has been done on proper design and implementation of P2P streaming sys[25]. Attacks against overlay formation
tems, less work has been conducted in studying their vulnerabilities [25].
and exploiting neighbor selection were previously identified in the context of structured overlays such as Disfile sharing [12].
[12]. However,
However, none of the previously proposed solutions are
tributed Hash Tables (DHTs) for file
Specifiapplicable to mesh-based P2P streaming applications operating in realistic heterogeneous networks. Specifi[12] do not
cally, solutions relying on built-in invariants
invariants in the overlay structure to restrict neighbor selection [12]
cally,
work in mesh-based overlays that are unstructured in nature. Solutions assuming homogeneous networks
which restrict the size of in-neighbor and out-neighbor sets [45]
[45] do not work in heterogeneous networks
where nodes have different values for these sets due to different bandwidth capabilities. Induced-chum so[18] have a high cost that makes them prohibitive for real-time streaming. Finally, authentication
lutions [18]
mechanisms do not protect against the identified attacks as end user systems are often easily compromised
[3]
[3] and attackers can quickly gain new attack vectors [4].
Our paper has the following contributions:
• We identify and evaluate the effectiveness of neighbor selection attacks on unidirectional mesh-based
P2P streaming. We identify methods to amplify the attack and the conditions under which the attacks
have the greatest effect. Our results indicate the number of attackers,
attackers, polluting the neighbor list of
the membership server,
server, the placement strategy of the attacker,
attacker, and presence of chum are all factors
which amplify the effects of the attack. We demonstrate that attacking a system under chum has a
crippling effect on the performance, resulting in 20% of the original performance achieved by a stable
system when no attack occurs. Finally, targeting the source by attempting to place malicious nodes as
out-neighbors of it is the most effective strategy for an attacker to attack a stable system.
• We propose a novel solution for the defense and mitigation of neighbor selection attacks. Our solution
is based on the observation that the attacks change the graph properties of the overlay topology.
topology.
Specifically,
[61] to limit the selection of malicious nodes
Specifically, we use the clustering coefficient of a node [61]
as neighbors. Our solution is scalable, has low overhead, and works in heterogeneous environments.
environments.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness
effectiveness of our mechanism through real-world experiments on the PlanetLab
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[39]
[39] Internet testbed using the Chainsaw [37]
[37] system. In addition, we investigate the scalability of
our method through simulations
[7] simulator which provides the ability to deploy
simulations using the OverSim [7]
overlays with sizes beyond those available on PlanetLab.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
follows: We provide an overview of mesh-based peer-to-peer
streaming overlays in Section 2 and attacks against them in Section 3. We propose mitigation mechanisms
in Section 4. We present experimental results demonstrating the impact of the attacks and the effectiveness
of our solutions in Section 5. We overview related work in Section 6 and conclude our work in Section 7.

2 System
System Model
In this section, we present the mesh-based P2P architecture considered in this work. The model is general
enough to capture the neighbor selection process of many of the mesh-based systems used today such as
[40,42,55].
[40,
42, 55].
We consider a unidirectional overlay mesh consisting of a source, one or more membership servers, and
traffic while the membership
peer nodes. The source (sometimes known as the seed) initiates the broadcast traffic
servers are used to help a new node to join the overlay.
overlay. Note that the membership server just
just supplies a list
live. Figure 1 presents an example of a
of possible neighbors and does not track which nodes are actually live.
unidirectional mesh with one source and one membership server. Each node maintains three lists of nodes,
a list of in-neighbors,
out-neighbors, and a list of candidates.
in-neighbors, a list of out-neighbors,
candidates. The set of in-neighbors
in-neighbors of a node v
out-neighbors of a node v consists of the nodes
consists of the nodes providing service for v. The set of out-neighbors
for. The set of candidates
v is providing service for.
candidates of a node v consists of nodes which v can reach in the
in-neighbors for v. A node may have multiple in-neighbors
in-neighbors and
overlay and represent a pool of potential in-neighbors
out-neighbors. For example, for node 6, the in-neighbors
in-neighbors set consists of node 7 and the source, while the
out-neighbors.
out-neighbors set consists of nodes 1 and 9.
out-neighbors
I.
Algorithm 1:
1: In-Neighbor Selection algorithm executed by a node v to select its in-neighbors
in-neighbors set I.
The code is executed when v receives
N from node w. The target and minimum
receives an in-neighbors
in-neighbors set N
size of the in-neighbors
in-neighbors set are INS_THRESHOLD
INS-THRESHOLD and MIN-INS_THRESHOLD,
MINlNS-THRESHOLD, respectively. The
out-neighbor
O.
out-neighbor set of node v is 0.
Input:
N, w's
Input: N,
w's list of in-neighbor nodes
Output:
Output: II,, v's list of in-neighbor nodes
1 neighbors =
=I
U 0;
0;
1
I U
2 foreach
foreach nj
N do
nj in N
(sizeof ( I ) >= INS-THRESHOLD)
if (sizeof(I)
INS-THRESHOLD) then
3
4
I( break;
5
end
6
if (neighbors
nj)
(neighbors contains n
j )then
continue;
7
I continue;
8
end
9
Request nj
nj to be in II;;
10
if (nj
request) then
(nj granted the request)
11
ddnjtoI;
11
I aaddnjtoI;
12
end
13 end
14 if (sizeof(l)
MINJNS-THRESHOLD) then
(sizeofll) < MINJNS-THRESHOLD)
15 I Contact membership server M and request more candidates;
candidates;
16 else
17 I Choose a node p from neighbors that has not been asked recently and request its in-neighbor set;
18 end

1

I

1
1

In order to join
I), which
join the mesh, a new node v contacts a membership server (Node M in Figure 1),
responds with a random subset of nodes N
N=
= {n
{ n1,
l ,...
. . . ,,nn}
n,) that are currently in the system. This represents
4

Algorithm
Algorithm 2:
2: Out-Neighbor Selection algorithm executed by a node v to decide ifif it can add node n
to
its
out-neighbors
list O.
I and the maximum number of
of out-neighbors
to its
0. The in-neighbors list of v is I
is
of v.
is MAX_ONS_THRESHOLD,
MAX-ONS-THRESHOLD, set based on the available bandwidth of
Input:
Input: A node nn that wants to be an out-neighbor and 00the list of out-neighbors
11
2
33
4
5
676
7

Output:
Output: True
True if node
node is
is accepted,
accepted, false otherwise
if(sizeof(O)
>=
then
if (size0f (0)
>= MAX_ONS-THRESHOLD)
MAX-ONS-THRESHOLD)
return false;
false;
else
else
add
add nn to
to 0;
0;
send
send list
list II to
to n;
n;
true;
end return true;
end

I1

;I

the
the initial candidate set of v. As nodes can leave, crash or become saturated and not able to service other
nodes, this list of potential candidates changes over time. When a node requires more in-neighbors but the
candidate
candidate list is
is too small,
small, it contacts the membership server or a random node and requests more nodes.
Additionally, when a node nj accepts the request to be an in-neighbor for v, it will also provide v with a list
of its
its current in-neighbors.
in-neighbors.
Algorithm 11 describes the method in which a node v selects its in-neighbors. After obtaining an initial
list N
N to request node nj to provide service to it.
N from
from a membership server,
server, vv contacts each node nj in N
If
a
node
nj
accepts
to
provide
service
for
v,
v
will
add
nj
to
its
list of
of in-neighbors.
in-neighbors. This process continues
If node nj accepts
until node vv has the target number of in-neighbors (usually a system constant) or no other potential inuntil
available. Similarly, Algorithm 2 presents the method a node nj uses to accept a
neighbors candidates are available.
to its out-neighbors
out-neighbors list.
list.
node to
We assume heterogeneous links.
links. Each node independently decides how many out-neighbor nodes it can
We
support based on the available
available bandwidth. The source streams data in chunks to all out-neighbor nodes
connected to it.
it. Due to the real-time nature of the streaming overlays, all data packets not received within a
predefined time limit will be discarded as they are unusable by the application.

Neighbor Selection
Selection Attack
3 Neighbor
3.1 Attacker
Attacker Model
3.1
We consider a constrained - collusion Byzantine adversary model. Specifically,
We
Specifically, we assume given a system
size S,
S,the system contains a bounded percentage of malicious nodes f (0
5 f < 1)
of size
(0::::;
1) behaving arbitrarily.
The set of malicious nodes may collude. We assume a malicious adversary has access to all data at a node as
The
any legitimate user would (insider access), including cryptographic keys stored at a node. This access can
any
the result of the adversary bypassing the authentication mechanisms or compromising a node through
be the
other means. Nodes cannot be completely trusted although they are authenticated. We assume that data
and integrity mechanisms are deployed and we focus only on neighbor selection attacks.
authentication and

3.2 Attacks
Attacks Description
Description
3.2
We consider neighbor selection attacks as a primary mechanism for an attacker to control the mesh formation
We
and maintenance. The goal of the attack is to enable a malicious node or coalition of
and
of malicious nodes to be
to provide service
service to as many honest nodes as possible. This can be achieved ifif malicious nodes
selected to
are selected as
as in-neighbors for the victim nodes. To control the in-neighbor selection, an attacker attempts
are
to infiltrate and dominate the neighbor sets of as many honest nodes as possible. Once malicious nodes
to
the overlay,
overlay, they accept as many nodes as they can as out-neighbors,
join the
out-neighbors, possibly lying about how many
out-neighbors they can support.
support.
5

Malicious nodes may dominate the neighbor set of honest nodes by polluting the membership server
or by lying about their in-neighbors
in-neighbors and only referring other malicious nodes to honest nodes in either a
server pollution, pandemic
random or strategic localized fashion.
fashion. We refer to these attacks as membership sewer
and outbreak attacks. These attacks are epidemic in nature since honest nodes will unintentionally refer
malicious nodes that are in their neighbor set to other honest nodes.
server pollution attack: The membership servers are critical points for bootstrapping the
Membership sewer
mesh overlay. One of the strongest attacks against a mesh-based streaming system is to pollute the neighbors
server,
list maintained by the membership server. As almost any new node will first contact the membership server,
by contaminating it, an attacker increases its chances of being selected as an in-neighbor.
in-neighbor. Malicious nodes
can accomplish this by performing a Sybil [22]
[22] attack on the membership server,
server, polluting its neighbor list
by registering many times with different identities.
Outbreak attack:
attack: Outbreak attacks are localized attacks that can be effectively conducted by small coalitions of malicious nodes. In an outbreak attack, malicious nodes always provide the same list of in-neighbor
in-neighbor
nodes to honest nodes. Such an attack allows the malicious nodes to better control the target of the attack.
An attacker would choose to perform an outbreak attack when it only knows a few other malicious nodes, it
wishes to appear benign, or it wishes to conceal the identities of other malicious nodes.
Pandemic attack: Pandemic attacks broadly impact the system and may require a larger set of compromised nodes than outbreak attacks. In a pandemic attack, malicious nodes select a random subset of
in-neighbors. An attacker may perform
malicious nodes every time they are queried to provide their list of in-neighbors.
a pandemic attack to mask malicious behavior as it reports a random subset of peers as its neighbors.

.---.
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Figure 2: Example of a unidirectional mesh-based streaming overlay under attack. After conducting a
neighbor selection attack, the malicious node was selected as an in-neighbor by nodes 7,
7 , 8, 9 and 10.
10. If
If the
malicious node decides to use this position to further attack the system and drop the traffic,
traffic, nodes served by
the malicious node will not receive the streaming data.

An attacker can distribute the attack across
across multiple nodes in the network or focus
focus on particular nodes,
flow facilitates further attacks such as selective data forwarding,
including the source. Controlling the data flow
cheating, traffic
traffic analysis, overlay partitioning, or denial of service against target nodes not even part of the
overlay. Figure 2 depicts an attack in which the malicious node managed to be selected to the in-neighbors
7, 8, 9 and 10,
10, thus controlling the traffic to these nodes. If
If it decides to selectively forward
set of nodes 7,
7, 8, 9 and 10
10 served by the malicious node will not receive the streaming data.
data, then nodes 7,

4 Mitigating Attacks
Neighbor selection attacks are conducted by compromised nodes. As a result, defense techniques against
such attacks cannot rely exclusively on cryptographic mechanisms since an adversary may have complete
access to all the keys stored on a compromised node. In addition, although attackers can use their control
6
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(a)
(a) no malicious nodes

(b) 20% malicious nodes

100 seconds into an experimental run on PlanetLab. The
Figure 3: Connections of a Chainsaw experiment 100
experiment was conducted with an overlay of 100
100 nodes for demonstrative purposes in order to have less
graphs. The same trend was noticed for larger overlay sizes.
sizes. Note that in Figure 3(b) that the
cluttered graphs.
presence of an attacker creates a hub of malicious nodes instead of a random graph structure as seen in 3(a)
of the neighbor set to conduct further attacks such as selective data dropping, cheating, overlay partitioning,
traffic analysis, our solution does not assume observable effects of these secondary attacks, since not all
of them are observable by an honest node. Instead, our solution focuses only on directly observed results
specifically the changes created in the overlay
from the presence of malicious nodes in the neighbors set, specifically
characteristics.
One way to approach the problem is to identify invariants
invariants in the node placement in the overlay and
invariants to detect malicious nodes and restrict their location. This method was
use deviations from such invariants
used successfully in structured overlays such as DHTs. Unlike DHTs, mesh-based streaming systems are
unstructured in nature and do not contain such invariants.
invariants. Recent studies [5,
[5, 58]
581 of mesh-based streaming
systems noted that many of them use a data plane that appears to be constructed randomly.
randomly. This was also
confirmed by several deployments we conducted with Chainsaw,
Chainsaw, a P2P mesh-based streaming system. This
random structure can be seen in Figure 3(a), which presents a 100
100 nodes deployment ofthe
of the Chainsaw system
on the PlanetLab Internet testbed.
Other possible defense techniques, such as the membership server periodically dropping nodes from its
membership list, may actually have a detrimental effect on the system. The only time a node contacts the
membership server is upon initially joining the network in order to receive a set of potential neighbors. If
If a
benign node is dropped from the membership list, it will never be selected as a potential neighbor and the
utility of the system will drop. Furthermore, malicious nodes may continually reintroduce themselves to
server. Thus, this defense mechanism can actually cause the membership list to contain a
the membership server.
higher percentage of malicious nodes.
Our solution relies on the observation that the presence of attackers changes the properties of the graph
formed by the overlay.
overlay. Since malicious nodes are attempting to place themselves in as many neighbor
sets as possible, this intuitively
intuitively suggests that the resulting graph will be more connected and less random.
Stronger attacks will result in more significant changes with some attackers being extremely connected and
acting as hubs in the network. For example, Figure 3(b) shows
shows the same 100
100 nodes Chainsaw deployment
on PlanetLab when 20% percent of the nodes are malicious and conducting a membership server pollution
attack combined with an outbreak attack.
attack. As can be seen, the malicious nodes distort the overlay graph
structure and become the hub of the entire network.
7

Algorithm
Algorithm 3:
3: Clustering Coefficient Computation algorithm used by the Modified In-Neighbor Selection algorithm. The threshold for the clustering coefficient is CC-THRESHOLD set based on the
maximum size of in-neighbors
in-neighbors set and the size of the overlay. The in-neighbor set is I and the out0.
neighbor set is O.

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Input:
Input: A node v's
v's neighbors and v's neighbors in-neighbor sets
Output:
Output: A node ni to disconnect if the clustering coefficient is too high, null otherwise
=J
IU
U 0;
0;
neighbors =
= 0;
0;
edges =
foreach nj in neighbors do
foreach
nj.edge-count
= 0;
0;
nj
.edge_count =
end
II
/ / Compute clustering coefficient
foreach
foreach nj in
in neighbors do
foreach ni in nj.J
nj .I do
foreach
if (neighbors contains ni)
n i ) then
ni .edge-count+;
ni.edge_count++;
edges++;
edges*;
end
e!d
end
end
clustering_coefficient
clustering-coe f f icient = edges lI (sizeof(neighbors)*(sizeof(neighbors)
(sizeof(neighbors)*(sizeof(neighbors)- 1));
if (CC_THRESHOLD
( C C - T H R E S H O L D < clustering_coefficient)
clustering-coef f i c i e n t ) then
/ / Select node that contributes most to
to clustering coefficient to
to disconnect
II
return node ni with greatest edge_count;
edge-count;
else
return NULL;
end

I1

1

/

1

I

I
I1

We propose to measure how connected an honest node will become when adding a malicious node as an
in-neighbor
in-neighbor by using the clustering coefficient introduced in [61].
[61]. The clustering coefficient is computed for
a node with respect to its neighbors by dividing all the existent edges in its neighborhood graph by the total
number of possible edges. Consider a unidirectional mesh-based streaming modeled as a directed graph
(V, E)
E) where V
V is the set of nodes in the system and E
E is the set of ordered pairs of vertices denoting
G == (V,
vi can be computed as follows:
follows:
edges. Then, the clustering coefficient for Vi

C;•

=

I{ejdl
(

k i k i -1)

: Vj, Vk E

v:,ejk

E

E

(1)

({ejk)l denotes the cardinality of the set of edges between nodes which are neighbors of node Vi,
vi,
where I{ejdl
and ki(k
ki(ki
1) represents the total number of possible edges that could exist among the vertices within the
i -- 1)
kii is the total degree of vertex Vi.
vi.
neighborhood where k
As a graph becomes more random, there exists fewer edges between neighbors of a particular node Vv and
thus the clustering coefficient of Vv approaches zero. Because malicious nodes place themselves in as many
neighbor sets as possible, their presence will raise the clustering coefficient due to an increase in the number
of links between neighbor nodes. By monitoring the size of their clustering coefficient, honest nodes can
detect malicious nodes and remove them from their in-neighbors
in-neighbors set.
set.
in-neighbors selection algorithm using the clustering coefficient comAlgorithm 4 presents the modified in-neighbors
in-neighbors selection is modified such that a node can
putation described in Algorithm 3. The original in-neighbors
in-neighbors lists
lists raises the clustering coefficient over a certain
detect if the addition of some node on the in-neighbors
If the clustering coefficient is too high, the node disconnects the neighbor that occurs most frethreshold. If
quently in all of its neighbors' in-neighbor sets and blacklists it for the time being. Each node periodically
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Algorithm 4:
4: Modified In-Neighbor Selection algorithm executed by a node v to select its ininneighbors set I when it receives an in-neighbors
N from node w. The target and minimum
in-neighbors set N
size of the in-neighbors
in-neighbors set are INS_THRESHOLD
INS-THRESHOLD and MIN-.lNS_THRESHOLD,
MINDIS-THRESHOLD, respectively.
respectively. The
MAXJXEQUEST~. The
maximum number of requests made from a single node's neighbor set is MAXREQUESTS.
out-neighbor
out-neighbor set of node v is O.
0. The delay between algorithm iterations is TIME-OUT.
Input:
Input: N,
N, w's list of in-neighbor nodes
Output:
Output: II,, v's list of in-neighbor nodes

=

1 neighbors = I U
U 0;
0;
2 if (neighbors
(neighbors contains w)
w ) then

3
4

I1
1

w.past-neighbors = w.past-neighbors UN;
U N;
w.past-neighbors
w.in_neighbors
w.in-neighbors =
= N;

5 end
6 while ((ni
((ni=
= compute_cLustering_coe!!icientO)
compute-clustering-coe f ficient()) !=
!= NULL) do

I

I

ni.past-neighbors that we are connected to;
7
disconnect ni and any ni.past-neighbors
8
add ni and ni.past-neighbors
ni.past-neighbors to blacklist;
9 end
10 requests =
= 0;
0;
11
11 foreach
foreach nj
nj in N do
12

13
14
15

t:

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1

(requests >= MAXREQUESTS))
if ((size0f ( I ) >= INS-THRESHOLD)
if((sizeo!(I)
INS-THRESHOLD) II11 (requests
MAX..REQUESTS)) then
break;
end
if ((blacklist
nj)
peer in
((blacklist contains nj)
n j ) III I (neighbors
(neighbors contains n
j ) III I (nj
(nj is already connected to more than
than one peer
neighbors))
neighbors)) then
continue;
end
requests ++;
++;
Request nj
nj to be in in_neighbor
in-neighbor set I;
if (nj
request) then
(nj granted the request)
add nj to II;;
end

I1

I1

I1

end
sleep TIME-OUT;
MINJNS-THRESHOLD)then
TIME-OUT; if (sizeof(I)
(sizeof(1) < MINlNS-THRESHOLD)
then
Contact membership server M and request more candidates;
else
Choose a node p from neighbors that has not been asked recently and request its in-neighbor set;
end

I1
I1

probes each of its neighbors asking for up-to-date in-neighbor sets. As in the original neighbor selection
algorithm (presented in Algorithm 1),
l), every time a node adds a new node to its in-neighbors
in-neighbors list, it requests
the neighbor set of the new node.
Resiliency of the defense mechanism.
mechanism. The defense mechanism is itself resistant to malicious activity for
several reasons. First, if a malicious node reports incorrect neighbor sets while being in the in-neighbor set
of other benign nodes, it will be identified
identified and disconnected. Secondly,
Secondly, a malicious node can attempt to
falsely implicate other benign nodes. For example, a malicio}ls
malicio~snode could mimic a benign node's neighbor
set, thus raising the benign node's clustering coefficient.
coefficient. These types of attacks can be prevented by a
simple augmentation to the defense mechanism that disconnects nodes with similar neighbor sets.
sets. Finally,
malicious nodes may collude and choose a target benign node to include in all of their in-neighbor
in-neighbor sets. In
doing this, the malicious collective tries to force other benign nodes to disconnect from the targeted node
and add a malicious neighbor instead. However,
However, it takes time for the updated neighbor sets to propagate and
there is no guarantee that benign nodes will select a malicious neighbor as a replacement, thus making the
attack marginally effective.
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5 Experimental Results
Results
We demonstrate through experimental results the identified
identified attacks and the effectiveness of our solution in
the context of the Chainsaw [37]
[37] mesh-based P2P streaming system.
system. As many of the existing P2P streaming
systems are proprietary, we selected Chainsaw because its neighbor selection mechanism is very similar with
the one used by other mesh-based P2P systems and we were able to obtain a copy of it. We conduct real-life
experiments on the PlanetLab [39]
[39] Internet testbed. In addition, to validate the scalability of our method,
we conducted simulations with overlay
overlay sizes beyond those that can be deployed on PlanetLab using the
OverSim [36]
[36] P2P simulator.
simulator. We selected OverSim because it offered increased scalability and flexibility.
flexibility.
Below, we provide an overview of Chainsaw,
methodology, and then present an
Chainsaw, describe our experimental methodology,
evaluation of the attacks and of our solution technique.

5.1
5.1 Overview of Chainsaw
Chainsaw is a mesh-based P2P streaming system using a pull-based approach in which nodes request packets from a set of peer nodes, the in-neighbor set. We have modified Chainsaw so that it constructs a unidirectional mesh instead of a bidirectional mesh. This provides support for nodes with larger bandwidth
capabilities to accept more nodes in their out-neighbor set. The node join and neighbor selection are as
described in Section 2.
When a node receives
receives a new packet, it notifies its neighbors about it. In addition, each node maintains
information about the packets available
available to other peers, referred to as the window ofavailability.
of availability. This window
is a buffer that contains packets
packets that have recently
recently been received and information about which peers were
notified. Packets are discarded after a predefined amount of time to prevent old data from being propagated
in the overlay. Each node also maintains a list of the packets it is interested in, referred to as the window of
of
interest, by tracking the notifications
notifications of available packets advertised by each of its neighbors. Based on the
window of interest, a node randomly
randomly selects packets to request from all available peers.

5.2 Experimental Methodology
In this section, we present our methodology for the experiments and simulations. We discuss the attack
scenarios we consider and introduce the metrics we use to evaluate the attacks and the effectiveness of our
solution.
PlanetLab
PlanetLab experimental
experimental methodology. To study the attacks under real-world conditions, we conducted
widely-used PlanetLab [39,
[39, 16]
161 Internet testbed.
testbed. PlanetLab provides a research platour experiments on the widely-used
[47]. In order to
form for large scale distributed experimentation of peer-to-peer systems over the Internet [47].
mitigate the possible limitations of using a testbed, such as those discussed in [47], we ran several
several experiments at different times of the day and different days of the week. Further, we randomly selected experimental nodes for different experiments to validate the statistical significance of results and nodes were chosen
to span multiple operational and administrative domains. We run each experiment ten times and average
intervals were omitted from the graphs due to their small range (about 30kbps),
the results. Confidence intervals
regardless
regardless of the streaming rate.
We used a maximum of 300 nodes in the experiments because this is the largest number of nodes
with access bandwidth greater than 1 Mbps that could be reliably accessed. We used streaming bit rates
of 400 kbps to 1 Mbps, which are representative of the bit rates used in many current video streaming
applications [26]. The source was always located on a host at Purdue University.
University. We configured the source
to wait for 30 seconds before starting to send data. We consider that a packet must arrive within 5 seconds
to be considered useful, according to the buffer times used in [30,
24, 2]. We configured Chainsaw such that
[30,24,2].
15 in-neighbors, and assumes the request for a packet is lost after 1 second.
each node uses a minimum of 15
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Figure 4:
4: Out-neighbor
Out-neighbor heterogeneity of a Chainsaw experiment using 300 nodes on PlanetLab, where the
of that node. The average
number of out-neighbors
out-neighbors of a node is proportional to the bandwidth capabilities of
number of out-neighbors
(J" =
= 19.4. The distribution of
of the
out-neighbors is p,
,LL =
= 18.38
18.38 and the standard deviation is a
number of out-neighbors
out-neighbors approximately follows
follows an exponential curve.
Honest nodes decide the number of the out-neighbors
out-neighbors they support based on their available bandwidth. The
source
out-neighbors and pushes two copies of every packet. All Chainsaw parameters above
source supports
supports 30
30 out-neighbors
were
were set
set based on previous reported deployments as in [37,44].
[37,44].
OverSim
OverSim simulations
simulations methodology.
methodology. OverSim [7,
[7, 36]
361 is an open-source overlay network simulation
framework supporting several
of
several models for structured and unstructured P2P protocols and scaling to tens of
thousands of nodes.
We simulate the join process described in Section 2. In each experiment, nodes join
of 20 per
We
join at a rate of
second to allow the system to accommodate the new nodes. Once they joined the overlay, the nodes stay
in the overlay until the end of the simulation. To match the Chainsaw setup, nodes attempt to maintain 15
in-neighbors at all
all times. We simulate the number of out-neighbors
out-neighbors a node will accept based on results
in-neighbors
Chainsaw deployments on PlanetLab. Figure 4(a) presents the out-neighbor heterogeneity of
for Chainsaw
observed for
of
aa Chainsaw deployment of 300 nodes on PlanetLab. As depicted in Figure 4(b), the data closely follows an
exponential distribution. Based on this observation, we consider that the number of
of out-neighbors a node
accepts is
is based on an exponential distribution with a mean of 20, matching the average number of
accepts
of outChainsaw. The duration of each simulation is 10 minutes. We
neighbors observed on real deployments of Chainsaw.
run each simulation ten times and average the results. We do not simulate the actual transfer of
of data, as we
are solely concerned with the composition of the neighbors of a node.
are
scenarios. We conduct the neighbor selection attacks described in Section 3: membership server
Attack scenarios.
pollution,
outbreak,
attacks. In order to isolate the neighbor selection attacks, malicious nodes
pollution, outbreak, and pandemic attacks.
are configured to truthfully advertise what pieces of the stream they have. However, to emphasize the amount
are
data controlled by an adversary
adversary as a result of the attack, malicious nodes never fulfill any requests, either
of data
sending back a message saying that the packet is now out of
by dropping the request or by sending
of their window of
of
availability. Unlike honest nodes that accept a number of out-neighbors
out-neighbors based on their available bandwidth,
availability.
configured to accept up to 100
100 out-neighbors.
malicious nodes are configured
For the PlanetLab experiments, we consider the combination of membership pollution and outbreak
attacks as
as this
this is
is the strongest attack that we consider.
consider. Since pandemic attacks are not possible on PlanetLab
attacks
due to
to smaller system
system sizes,
sizes, we investigate them in OverSim where the larger system sizes allow us to
due
the attacks.
simulate the
To investigate
investigate the impact of attacker placement, we consider three scenarios:
To

General attack:
attack: attackers attempt to get in the neighbor set of any node in the system. This is the
• General
easiest way to conduct a neighbor selection attack, but may require a significant number of
of nodes to
significant damage.
damage.
generate significant
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5: System
System performance
PlanetLab for an overlay of 300 nodes when the
Figure 5:
performance and attack strength on PlanetLab
malicious
nodes
place
themselves
among
the
in-neighbors
in-neighbors of any node in the overlay (general
(general scenario).
scenario).
malicious
Malicious
server pollution combined with outbreak attack.
Malicious nodes conduct membership
membership sewer
attack. For demonstrative
demonstrative
purposes, malicious nodes also
purposes,
also drop
drop the traffic
traffic going through them.
them.
Source-only attack:
attack: attackers try to isolate
isolate the source
source by becoming the neighbors of the source.
source. In• Source-only
tuitively, this attack allows
allows an attacker to target the content of a particular channel or provider, while
tuitively,
requiring
attacker.
requiring less resources (compromised nodes)
nodes) from the attacker.
attack: attackers
attackers try to get in the neighbor set of peers other than the source.
source. This attack
• Peer-only
Peer-only attack:
may be used when the source
source is not reachable
reachable by the attacker.
attacker.

Metrics: We evaluate
evaluate the system by using the following
following metrics:
metrics:

average rate of data that was received before the deadline (5
(5 seconds)
seconds) and had not
• Goodput is the average
captures the useful data received by an application.
application.
been received before. Goodput captures
application data is received.
received. Throughput captures the
• Throughput is the average rate at which all application
including data received after the deadline or duplicates.
duplicates.
total amount of data received by the users including
al. [63],
[63], is used to measure the effect of churn.
chum. It is equal to
• Continuity Index, defined by Zhang et al.
the goodput divided
divided by the total amount of data that could have possibly been received while a peer
streamingRate. Ideally,
Ideally, the continuity index should
should be 1.
1.
participated in the overlay,
overlay, or Str:a:1~;1ate.
• Tau Attack Strength, defined by Walters
Walters et al.
al. [60],
1601, is used to measure the relative
relative strength
strength of a
system. It is defined as:
particular attack on the system.
T

= max

(1000 x

G narm - Gadv
G narm x N adv '

0)

(2)

Gnmm
Gadv
average goodput in the absence
absence and presence of adversaries,
adversaries,
where G
narm and G
adv represent the average
adversaries. Intuitively,
Intuitively, TT represents the amount of damage
damage per
respectively. Nadv
respectively.
N adv is the number of adversaries.
degradation observed
observed in the
performance degradation
attacker an attack inflicted on the system. The greater the performance
scenarios (the difference
difference between G
Gnmm
Gadv), the
system between non-attack versus attack scenarios
narm and Gadv),
damage an attack inflicts on the system.
system.
higher the value of TT and the more damage
adversary has on the
• Corruption Factor, introduced in this paper, measures the level of control an adversary
neighbors of a particular node.
node. We define
define the corruption
corruption factor
factor as the percentage of nodes in the
neighbors
corruption factor should be zero.
zero. A corruption
corruption factor of 11
neighbor set that are malicious. Ideally the corruption
indicates that all neighbors of a node are adversarial.
adversarial.
indicates

Effectiveness
5.3 Attacks Effectiveness
In this section,
section, we demonstrate
demonstrate the attacks
attacks using a real P2P streaming
streaming system through real-world
real-world experidetermine factors
factors that amplify
amplify the attack such as number of the attackers,
attackers, attacker
ments. Our results seek to determine
placement strategy,
strategy, or presence
chum. We also
also seek to identify the strategy that provided the strongest
presence of churn.
damage per adversary's effort.
effort. Finally,
Finally, we show through simulations
simulations that the attacks are effective
effective in larger
damage
systems
as
well.
systems well.
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Figure 6: System performance and attack strength on PlanetLab for an overlay of 300 nodes when the
in-neighbors of the source (source-only
(source-only scenario). Malicious
malicious nodes place themselves among the in-neighbors
nodes conduct a membership
membership server pollution combined with outbreak attack. For demonstrative purposes,
malicious nodes also drop the traffic
traffic going through them.

Impact of number of attackers.
attackers. To investigate the effect of the number of attackers, we consider
the three attack scenarios, general,
general, source-only,
source-only, and peer-only with varying percentages of attackers. Figure 5(a) and 5(b) plot the throughput and goodput for a deployment of 300 nodes on PlanetLab under the
general scenario attack. Even with just 10%
10% malicious nodes (30 out of 300 nodes), the perceived quality
significantly. With 20% of the nodes being malicious, an attacker is able to effectively
of the system drops significantly.
deny service on the overlay. In the case of the peer-only scenario (Figures 7(a) and 7(b»
7(b)) the performance
degradation is more visible when 20% of the nodes are malicious, suggesting that not including the source
in the target nodes decreases the effectiveness of the attack. Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the performance
of the system when the only attacked node is the source. The effect of the attack is significant for different
streaming rates and increases with the number of malicious nodes.
We validated that the attack results presented are not a product of system randomness. We formulate the
null hypothesis Ho
pattack =
= pnOTmal,
H o : f..lattack
f..lnormal, which states system goodput under non-attack and attack conditions
have the same mean and distribution and implies the system behaves similarly under both conditions. Using
[33], we disproved H
Ho,
100%)
a two-sample t-test with pooled variance [33],
o, finding with high probability (nearly 100%)
that the error results come from distributions with different means, which implies the difference observed in
the results is due to the presence of malicious attackers.
Impact of attackers' placement strategy. We investigate which attack strategy is more effective in a
stable system. Specifically,
Specifically, we are interested in answering the following question: "For
"For the same number of attackers (or resources available to the attacker) which is the most effective strategy?" In Figure 6(a) and 6(b), the graphs depict the exact number of malicious nodes connecting to the source. The
out-neighbors
out-neighbors set size of the source was set to 30. Figures 7(a) and 7(b) depict the system performance
figures demonstrate that the attack is effective in
when malicious nodes connect only to other peers. The figures
degrading the performance of the system in both cases. Although the absolute performance degradation appears to be similar for the curves "20 malicious" source-only and "20% malicious" peer-only, the number of
attackers is different,
source-only case and 60 nodes (20% out of 300 nodes) in the peer-only
different, 20 nodes in the source-only
case. Figure 8 reveals that the attack that inflicts the greatest damage per attacker on the system is when
source-only scenario. The least effective strategy is peer-only. We conclude that the attacker reusing the source-only
ceives the "greatest" return per malicious node by targeting the source of the system and is the least efficient
when only targeting peer nodes.
Sensitivity
Sensitivity to churn. In previous cases we examined the effect of the attack when the system is stable.
Previous work has shown that, in general, mesh-based streaming systems perform well under churn [44].
We seek to evaluate the effectiveness
effectiveness of the attack in the presence of churn.
chum. We perform a membership
strategy. We first start the overlay
server pollution attack combined with an outbreak attack with a general strategy.
comprised of 80 normal nodes and 20 malicious nodes where the malicious nodes are stable and never leave.
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Figure 7:
performance and attack strength
7: System performance
strength on PlanetLab for an overlay of 300 nodes when the malicious
themselves among the in-neighbors
licious nodes place themselves
in-neighbors of nodes other than the source (peer-only
(peer-only scenario).
scenario).
Malicious
Malicious nodes conduct a membership server pollution combined with outbreak attack. For demonstrative
demonstrative
purposes, malicious
malicious nodes also drop the traffic going through them.
purposes,
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Figure 8:
general, source-only
source-only and peer-only,
peer-only, on
8: Attack strength
strength for the three attack placement strategies:
strategies: general,
PlanetLab,
malicious. Malicious nodes conduct a
PlanetLab, for an overlay of 300 nodes when 20% of the nodes are malicious.
attack. For demonstrative
demonstrative purposes, malicious nodes
membership server pollution combined with outbreak attack.
also drop the traffic going through them.

We then model node join behavior using a Poisson process and node stay time using a Pareto distribution.
distribution.
[14] and Mbone
observations from real overlay multicast deployments
deployments [14]
These choices were motivated by observations
sessions [6]
[6] and have been previously used by Bharambe
Bharambe et al. in [8].
sessions
distribution, we
[8]. For the Pareto
Pareto distribution,
1.42, which results in a mean stay time of 300
assume a minimum stay time of 90 seconds and an aa of 1.42,
assume
consistent with distributions
distributions found in other live streaming applications
applications on
seconds. These parameters
parameters are consistent
141. We vary the mean of the Poisson process between 5 and 15,
15, leading to group
group sizes
the Internet [49, 14].
varying from
from 170
170 to 300 nodes.
example, if the Poisson mean is set to 10,
10, then on average,
average, every 10
10
nodes. For example,
1000 seconds
seconds and the source
source streams
streams
seconds a node joins the overlay.
overlay. The duration
duration of each experiment
experiment is 1000
seconds
data at 1 Mbps. Our results in Figure 9 show that the attack is amplified by the chum
churn of the system.
system. This
leave, a node must replace that neighbor with a new node which could
is due to the fact that as neighbors leave,
possibly be malicious.
Since the malicious
stable, over time,
time, malicious
fill up the
malicious. Since
malicious nodes are stable,
malicious nodes will fill
normal node's neighbor set. Given that only 20 malicious nodes are involved in the attack (7% to 12%
12% of the
total overlay size),
size), the effect on the system is very damaging
damaging and drastically
decreases the continuity index
drastically decreases
from
from 0.9 to 0.2.
scalability of the attack for larger system sizes using
Scalability with system size. We investigate
investigate the scalability
simulator. We perform aapandemic
strategy. Figure 10
10 shows the average
the OverSim simulator.
pandemic attack with aageneral
general strategy.
average
corruption factor over time for a system size from 300 to 3000 of nodes. Note that when the system is not
corruption
0. The results show the rampant nature of the attack.
attack. In less than 100
100
under attack the corruption
corruption factor is O.
seconds, regardless
size, almost all nodes in the network have half or more of their neighbors
seconds,
regardless of the system size,
neighbors
14
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Figure 10:
10: Corruption factor on OverSim for simulations of different overlay sizes, where malicious nodes
place themselves among the in-neighbors
in-neighbors of any node in the overlay (general scenario). Malicious nodes
conduct a pandemic
pandemic attack.

being malicious. This demonstrates the epidemic nature of this attack where just a few malicious nodes can
corrupt a significant percentage of nodes in any given node's neighbor set. The results also demonstrate
that the attack is effective for larger system sizes and that a small percentage of attackers can take over the
neighbors of most of the nodes. For example, 20% malicious nodes present in the overlay are able to achieve
a corruption factor of 0.7, indicating that on average greater than half of the neighbors of each nodes are
malicious nodes.

5.4 Effectiveness
Effectiveness of Our Solution
Solution
In this section, we study the effectiveness of our solution to mitigate the identified
identified attacks. We first discuss
the clustering coefficient threshold selection and then demonstrate the solution when the system is under
attack. We show that our solution has little overhead and works for larger system sizes.
Threshold selection.
selection. As described in Section 4,
4, our solution prevents malicious nodes from becoming
in-neighbors for honest nodes based on a clustering coefficient threshold. We observe that malicious nodes
will raise the clustering coefficient above that of a random graph. To accurately detect malicious nodes,
we set the threshold to be the expected clustering coefficient of a random graph, which is the average
node in-degree (e.g. 15)
15) divided by the total overlay size. For example, in our PlanetLab experiments we
set it to be 15/300
151300 =
= .05. We experimentally validated this threshold setup through numerous PlanetLab
deployments and OverSim simulations. Further simulations where we varied the clustering coefficient based
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12: Goodput and corruption factor on PlanetLab for an overlay of 300 nodes when 20 malicious nodes
place themselves among the in-neighbors of the source (source-only scenario). Malicious nodes conduct a
place
sewer pollution combined with an outbreak attack. For demonstrative purposes, malicious
membership server
nodes drop
drop traffic
traffic going through them.
them. The system is tested without and with our solution in place. Note
nodes
factor represents the corruption of the source since it is the only node under attack.
that the corruption factor

an overestimation or underestimation of the overlay size revealed that as long as the error of
of the estimated
on an
size is
is less
less than 33%
33% of the total overlay
overlay size, there is little effect on the performance of
size
of the algorithm. This
implies that the algorithm is largely
largely insensitive to the threshold. These simulation graphs were not included
implies
for lack
lack of space.
space.
for
False positives.
positives. During our experimentation and simulation, we found that false positives do not hinder
False
the performance of the system.
system. We believe this is true for two reasons. First, benign nodes are connected
the
to multiple
multiple nodes in the system
system and if they are disconnected from a neighbor or set of
to
of neighbors, they can
easily establish new connections to different neighbors. Secondly, we note that P2P streaming applications
easily
581. It has been shown that this type of
have been shown to form random graphs
graphs [5,
[5, 58].
have
of network structure
can significantly
significantly increase the speed and extent of data propagation as long as it stays random [6'\].
[61]. Even if
if
is falsely
falsely identified as malicious and disconnected (since it raised the clustering- coefficient
a benign node is
desired cutoff),
cutoff), false
false positives help to maintain a random graph and may actually
of other nodes past the desired
enhance the
the performance of the network.
network.
enhance
Attack mitigation.
mitigation. We investigate
investigate the effectiveness of our solution on the PlanetLab testbed. FigAttack
ure II(a)
1](a) presents the goodput for a deployment of 300 nodes on PlanetLab, while under a membership
ure
sewer pollution and outbreak attack,
attack, in the general scenario, without and with our solution in place. As seen
server
in the figure,
figure, while under attack by 20% of malicious nodes, the goodput is decreased to only 100 Kbps,
in
regardless of the stream rate. When our solution is enabled, the performance of
regardless
of the system is very close to
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13: Corruption factor on OverSim for a simulation for different overlay sizes, where malicious nodes
Figure 13:
place themselves among the in-neighbors of any node in the overlay (general scenario). Malicious nodes
pandemic attack. The system is tested with our solution in place. Corresponding corruption factor
conduct aapandemic
10.
for the system under attack and without our solution is presented in Figure 10.
the case when no attacker exists in the system. We attribute the attack mitigation to the fact that our method
decreases the number of malicious nodes in the in-neighbors
in-neighbors set. Indeed, as seen in Figure ll(b) which
presents the corresponding corruption factor,
factor, our method reduces the corruption factor from 0.8 to 0.2.
We also conducted experiments to investigate the effectiveness of our solution in the source-only scenario since it provides a high incentive for an attacker due to its high return per malicious node. Figure 12(a)
12(a)
presents the case when 20 nodes of the out-neighbors of the source are malicious. Our solution is able to
mitigate the attack and bring the performance of the system close to the case when no malicious node was
present in the system.
system. A closer examination of the corruption factor presented in Figure 12(b) shows that our
method decreases the corruption factor to 0.3, value slightly higher than in the case of the general scenario.
We validate that the difference between the system under attack using our defense mechanisms and
the system operating under non-attack conditions are statistically small, meaning our solution causes the
attacks to have little effect on the system. For the various number of attackers, we test the null hypothesis
H o : Pdefense
J-ldefense =
J-lnormaZ' Using a two-sample Hest
H o, finding
Ho
= Pnormal.
t-test with pooled variance [33],
[33], we disproved Ho,
that the actual mean of the system with defense is slightly greater than that of the system under non-attack
attack.
conditions. We conclude that our technique successfully mitigates the attack.
Overhead.
Overhead. One of the features
features of our solution is that it has very little overhead. In particular, little additional communication overhead is added to the system as the nodes already exchange the set of in-neighbors
coefficient. In addition, the clustering coefficient computation has very
that we use to compute the clustering coefficient.
small computation overhead. In Figure ll(a),
w/sol" denotes the goodput
1l(a), the curve labeled "0% malicious w/sol"
when no malicious nodes are present in the system while our detection mechanism is enabled. When comparing this curve with the one labeled "0% malicious" in Figures 5(b), which denotes the goodput of the
system when no malicious nodes are in the system and our solution is not enabled, we note that the values are
almost identical. This indicates that the overhead of our method is basically non-existent and our solution
has no negative impact on the performance of the system when there are no adversaries in the system.
Scalability with overlay size. We find through simulations that our solution is effective and can limit the
number of malicious nodes in a neighbor set even for large system sizes. In Figure 13,
13, we plot the average
corruption factor for different system sizes and different percentages of malicious nodes when malicious
nodes perform a pandemic attack. The figures
figures show that our solution significantly decreases the corruption
factor.
1l(a) and ll(b)
1l(b)
factor. Even if not all the malicious nodes are completely removed, as shown in Figure ll(a)
a small corruption factor (around 0.2) can be successfully tolerated by the system. While in all cases the
system stabilizes at a low corruption factor,
factor, the convergence time increases as the overlay size increases,
suggesting that additional mechanisms may be needed to speed up converge for large overlays.
overlays.
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6 Related
Related Work
Attacks
Attacks against overlay formation were previously identified
identified in the context of DHTs for file sharing [12]
and
and single-tree overlay multicast systems [60].
[60]. In addition, recent work also showed how P2P streaming
systems
of these works.
systems can be used to attack the Internet [35,20,51]. Below, we give an overview of
Exploiting the neighbor selection as a mechanism to control the overlay was first shown in the context
of structured
[12]. To defend against such attacks, referred to as eclipse
structured (DHT-based)
(DHT-based) homogenous overlays [12].
attacks,
attacks, Castro
Castro et al.
al. proposed constrained routing tables [12]
[12] where a node's routing table could only be
filled
with
other
nodes
that
had
identifiers
that
were
limited
to a certain range. Since this solution is specific
filled
identifiers
to
to DHTs,
DHTs, it is
is unsuitable for unstructured overlays.
overlays.
Singh
[45] which capitalizes on the observation that malicious
Singh et al.
al. suggested anonymous auditing [45]
nodes performing an eclipse
eclipse attack will have more neighbors than the average node. Nodes audit their
neighbors by asking an intermediary node to send a request for them to their neighbor for their neighbor list.
If
If the
the list
list is
is larger than the average
average or if the originating node is not in the list, the originating node will drop
that neighbor.
number
neighbor. This technique makes decisions based on the assumption that all nodes have the same number
of neighbors.
neighbors. However,
However, in heterogenous settings,
settings, nodes with large peer degrees are not only legitimate, but
often times encouraged, such as hierarchical file
file sharing overlays. Hence this technique cannot be applied
to
heterogenous
overlays.
to
overlays.
Condie et al.
al. proposed induced
induced chum
churn [18]
[18] to limit the effects of an eclipse attack on an overlay. The
technique forces
forces nodes to periodically assume new identities, wipe clean their routing tables and constantly
limit the rate at which their routing tables are updated. This limits the effect of amplification of
of the attack by
preventing
preventing malicious
malicious nodes from dominating the routing tables of normal nodes. While this technique can
overlay, is not necessarily suitable for streaming applications because of
be applied to an unstructured overlay,
of the
real-time deadlines imposed on them. Chum
Churn can often degrade the performance of
real-time
of streaming applications
[44].
to an
an unsatisfactory
unsatisfactory level as
as shown in [44].
to
The problem of parent selection in single-tree based multicast overlay was studied in [60]. The attacks
The
fact that the parent selection is done based on performance measurement metrics reported by
exploit the fact
set. The proposed solution decreases the number of malicious parents by using
nodes in the neighbor set.
outlier detection and limit the impact of malicious nodes by aggregating local information to derive global
reputation for each node.
shown the feasibility
feasibility of exploiting P2P systems to launch DDoS attacks impacting
Recent research has shown
environment, by causing large-scale distributed denial of service attacks on nodes not
the external Internet environment,
even part of the overlay
overlay system.
system. In particular, an attacker could subvert the neighbor selection mechanism,
even
and
force
a
large
fraction
of nodes in the system to believe in the existence of, and communicate with a
and force large
potentially arbitrary
arbitrary node in the Internet. The attacks have been shown on Overnet [35], and more recently
potentially
BitTorrent [20,
[20,51].
BitTorrent
51].

7

Conclusions
Conclusions

this paper,
paper, we focused on attacks
attacks against neighbor selection in mesh-based P2P streaming applications
In this
networks. Based on the observation that attackers disturb the topology of
deployed in heterogeneous networks.
of the
overlay, we proposed a technique to mitigate the impact of the attacks using the clustering coefficient. Our
overlay,
is lightweight,
lightweight, scalable and effectively mitigates the attack as shown through experiments on the
solution is
PlanetLab Internet testbed with a P2P streaming system and simulations using the OverSim simulator. Our
show that:
that:
results show
• Although mesh-based streaming systems are characteristically more resilient to failures and churn,
chum,
they are vulnerable to neighbor selection attacks that allow a small number of
attackers
to
inflict
of
significant damage
damage to the system,
system, irrespective
irrespective of its size. Our real-world experiments demonstrate
significant
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that the attack is epidemic in nature as malicious nodes refer each other as potential service providers
(i.e. in-neighbors).
factors amplify the attack besides the number of attackers. They are: polluting the neighbors
• Several factors
server, the placement strategy of the attacker, and the presence of chum. Our
list of the membership server,
results demonstrate that attacking the neighbors of the source is the most effective strategy for an
attacker to attack a stable system. This indicates that it is critical to protect the source against malicious
neighbors. Although mesh-based streaming was shown to perform well in non-adversarial networks in
chum conditions, our results indicate that attacking the system in the presence of chum has a crippling
effect on the performance, resulting in a decrease to just 20% of the original performance achieved by
the system when no attack occurs.
• Our solution is effective in mitigating the attacks and raises the bar for the attacker without adding
additional overhead in the system. In particular, our solution is very effective for stable overlays of
moderate sizes (up to one thousand nodes) for up to 20% malicious nodes. For overlays of greater
sizes, our solution significantly decreases the number of malicious nodes in the neighbor set, but has
sizes,
a higher convergence time.
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